Rational individual epistemic behavior might be distinct from rational group epistemic behavior. Groups of rational individuals may not make for the epistemically best groups. This idea was called "The Independence Thesis" by Mayo-Wilson, Danks, and Zollman. The group originally focused on one particular model of group problem solving and with one particular definition of what counts as "rational." In this talk, Zollman will explore other ways of defining notions like individual and group rationality, and explore versions of the independence thesis for them. Zollman will briefly introduce several models that illustrate independence-thesis-like behavior. Finally, Zollman will consider ways that one might rebut the independence thesis that parallel attempts to make cooperation rational in the prisoner's dilemma. Ultimately, Zollman concludes that epistemic rationality is like instrumental rationality: there can sometimes be a conflict between what's good for the group and what's good for the individual.