Recent years have seen an explosion of empirical data concerning arithmetical cognition. In this talk that data is taken to be philosophically important and an outline for an empirically feasible epistemological theory of arithmetic is presented. The epistemological theory is based on the empirically well-supported hypothesis that our arithmetical ability is built on a proto-arithmetical ability to categorize observations in terms of quantities that we have already as infants and share with many nonhuman animals. It is argued here that arithmetical knowledge developed in such a way cannot be totally conceptual in the sense relevant to philosophy of arithmetic. Neither can arithmetic understood to be empirical. Rather, we need to develop a contextual a priori notion of arithmetical knowledge that preserves the special mathematical characteristics without ignoring the roots of arithmetical cognition. Such a contextual a priori theory is shown not to require any ontologically problematic assumptions, in addition to fitting well within a standard framework of general epistemology.

Bibliography:
Markus Pantsar. An empirically feasible approach to the epistemology of arithmetic.
Synthese, forthcoming. DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0526-y